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"AREN'T YOU LUCKY YOU HAVE TWO MAMAS?": REDEFINING
PARENTHOOD IN LIGHT OF EVOLVING REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES AND SOCIAL CHANGE
JOHN G. NEW*
INTRODUCTION
Karen and Meg, a lesbian couple in a committed, long-term relation-
ship, decided to have a child together.1 Karen attempted to conceive a child
via in vitro fertilization with the support and assistance of Meg, who do-
nated the ovum to be fertilized with sperm from an anonymous donor. The
procedure was successful and the couple proceeded together through the
familiar yet profound rituals of pregnancy and labor, culminating in the
birth of a daughter. Karen, the gestational mother, had no genetic relation-
ship to the child, whereas Meg, who donated the ovum, had the same ge-
netic relationship to the child as any other "natural" parent would. The
child grew, looking to both Karen and Meg for the love and security she
required as much as food, clothing, and shelter. However, over the course
of time the relationship between the couple began to dissolve, and they
parted acrimoniously. Karen, who carried the child, claimed the right of a
parent to custody and acted to prevent Meg from seeing the child. Meg, the
genetic mother whose role as loving parent continued from conception
through the changing of diapers and beyond, found herself being denied the
company of a child she helped raise just as much as her former partner. The
child, without understanding why, found herself deprived of Meg, to
whom, with Karen, she always looked for the security and comfort of pa-
rental love.
* J.D. candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2007. B.S.,
The University of Massachusetts, 1978, M.S., The University of Michigan, 1981, Ph.D. Wesleyan
University, 1987. The author is Professor of Biology, Loyola University Chicago and Adjunct Professor
of Cell Biology, Neurobiology and Anatomy, Stritch School of Medicine, Loyola University of Chi-
cago. The author thanks Professor Lori Andrews for her many insights and assistance and Professor
Mae Ngai, Dept. of History, the University of Chicago, for her critical reading of the manuscript.
0 John G. New, 2005. This paper was the winner of the 2005 William J. Pierce Prize of the National
Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
1. The names and particular details of this scenario are fictional, but are based on the facts of a
number of cases discussed in this Note, particularly K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136 (Ct. App. 2004)
rev'd, 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005).
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Unhappy scenarios similar to this are finding their ways more and
more frequently into the state courts. In 2004 there were almost 300,000
households in the United States with a female householder living with a
female partner, a majority of which are presumably lesbian couples. 2 Ap-
proximately one-third of those female same-sex households had one or
more children, either biologically or by adoption.3 The advent and increas-
ing employment of in vitro fertilization, egg harvesting, and associated
reproductive technologies indicate that the option to have children will be
increasingly used by both heterosexual and homosexual couples wishing to
have a family.4 Moreover, changing social attitudes concerning same-sex
relationships are reshaping the legal definition of what it means to be an
American family in the twenty-first century. Such changes include the ad-
vent and general acceptance of domestic partnerships, the expansion of
adoption laws to include single individuals and same-sex couples as adop-
tive parents, and the potential imminence of officially sanctioned same-sex
marriage in several states. 5 These emergent technologies and changing
societal attitudes have given rise to new challenges for the law in defining
the term "parent."
Given the frailty of human nature, however, many of these same-sex
relationships are bound to fail, resulting in disputes between the former
partners over custody of, or visitation with, the children they have brought
into the world and nurtured in a family unit. With both former partners
2. The U.S. Census Bureau lists 293,365 households with a female householder and a female
partner. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-
PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000 2 tbl. 1 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-
5.pdf. Although the sexual orientation of householders is not explicitly recorded in that census, the 2000
census has similar numbers (293,000) of female-female households with individuals identifying them-
selves as having a "close personal relationship" rather than simply sharing housing. Id. at 1.
3. Id. at 9 tbl.4.
4. A survey conducted by the National Center for Disease Control determined that 9,156 in vitro
fertilizations (or related fertilization procedures) were performed in 2000, 6,731 from live (nonfrozen)
embryos and 2,425 from frozen embryos (383 clinics reporting). CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2000 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
SUCCESS RATES (2000), available at http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/art00/nation00acc.asp. Of the live embryo
transfers, 43.4 percent resulted in live births, whereas 23.5 percent of frozen embryo transfers resulted
in live births. Id. An average of three embryos were transferred per procedure (the mean was 2.9 for
live, 3.0 for frozen embryos), id., indicating that approximately 3,052 procedures occurred resulting in
approximately 3,491 births (including multiple births). Id.
5. Some estimate that there may be as many as 14 million children in the care of homosexual
parents. Charlotte J. Patterson & Richard E. Redding, Lesbian and Gay Families with Children: Impli-
cations of Social Science Research for Policy, 52 J. SOC. ISSUES 29, 36 (1996) (noting that estimates of
the number of children of such households range between 6 million and 14 million). Note that this study
is almost ten years old. Florida is the only state in the nation that categorically bans adoption by homo-
sexuals. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 2005). Mississippi and Utah have prevented adoptions by
same-sex couples; however homosexual individuals are not prohibited from adopting a child in those
states. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (West 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (West 2005)
(prohibiting adoption by persons cohabitating in a relationship generally).
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claiming parental rights, the courts are faced with a Solomon-like dilemma.
Who is a parent in the eyes of the law? Does a biological relationship con-
stitute the only real determinant of parental status? If so, does a gestational
relationship to a child trump a genetic relationship, or vice versa? Do a
person's historical actions in the role of parent, both pre- and postpartum,
carry any weight regarding the determination of parenthood? Can a child,
who has looked upon an adult as a parent for his or her entire life, be sud-
denly denied the company of that adult because a court determines that
only a biological or legal adoptive relationship determines parenthood, and
that individuals lacking such a relationship have no parental rights at all?
This Note examines the legal definitions of parentage and the argu-
ments used to support such definitions currently employed by several
states. This Note grapples with these complex issues and suggests a model
by which one can approach such challenging cases. Part I of this Note
briefly examines the range of criteria that states have historically employed
in defining parenthood, including analyses of the Uniform Parentage Acts
of 1973 and 2000. These Acts were based on common law definitions and
were intended to act as a template for the states in approaching legal issues
concerning parenthood, including the definition of "parenthood." Part II
describes cases with similar fact patterns that have arisen in different states,
and it contrasts the approaches that these states have employed in determin-
ing parenthood. Specifically, these cases examine the efforts of same-sex
partners who have participated in the conception and birth of a child, and
who have acted in a parental role to the child, to establish rights as a parent.
Finally, the Part III proposes a new definition of parenthood that includes
not only genetic and gestational relatedness but also the intentions and
behavior of both partners before and after birth. Such a definition, combin-
ing biological concepts of relatedness with the party's intentions, may be
useful to state legislatures when drafting statutes defining family rights and
obligations.
I. DETERMINING PARENTAGE: HISTORY, COMMON LAW, AND THE
UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
Historically, the legal determination of the identity of a child's parent
was fairly simple, at least with respect to the mother. The mother of a new-
born infant was invariably the woman who had successfully carried it to
term and delivered it. Although there was no definitive method for conclu-
sively establishing the identity of the father, a man married to, or cohabit-
ing with, the mother was presumed to be the father, a presumption that
20061
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continues in legal codifications of parenthood to this day.6 Such a presump-
tion of paternity could be rebutted, but these rebuttals were difficult and
rare, requiring some sort of direct evidence or testimony indicating that the
man could not have fathered the child due to incapacity or lack of access to
the mother. 7 Furthermore, only a parent could rebut the presumption of
paternity; an outsider to the family unit claiming paternity could not claim
substantive parental rights even if very strong biological evidence indicated
that he was in fact the father.8 Thus, the legal definition of motherhood has
historically been biological in nature, based on gestation. Paternity, on the
other hand, has been largely socially defined; the man living with the
woman at the time of putative conception and birth was presumed by the
law to be the father, and his legal right was protected against other men-it
could only challenged by himself or by the mother.9 These legal definitions
of maternity and paternity emerged, with adoption laws, early in the com-
mon law in an era when the degree of genetic relatedness between a child
and a putative parent could not be definitively established. In most cases
these legal definitions were satisfactory for determining parental status.
Until the advent of reproductive technologies such as in vitro fertiliza-
tion in the late 1970s and early 1980s, most laws specifically dealing with
issues of parenthood addressed adoption and the legal status of children
bom to unmarried heterosexual couples. In early English common law, the
legitimacy of a child born in wedlock was not open to dispute: the husband
was presumed to be the father and the presumption could not be rebutted. 10
This ancient doctrine was later repudiated, and by the eighteenth century it
was possible for a man to attack the legitimacy of a child born to his wife,
although to do so required proof beyond a reasonable doubt."I Even so, the
presumption of paternity was so strong that a man who acknowledged a
child as his own was accepted as the father. Under the common law, any
man who thus took a child into his home and "held it out to the world as his
own" was the father, regardless of any actual biological relationship.
6. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) prefatory note (amended 2000), 9B U.L.A. 369, 379
(2001).
7. Id. See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-25 (1989).
8. See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125-26.
9. This is hardly surprising given both the historic difficulty in definitively assigning paternity
absent genetic technology and society's interest in protecting the family unit as well as the legal mecha-
nisms of inheritance.
10. See Wartone v. Simon, (1307) 32 Edw. 1 60 (allowing claimant to recover an estate at an
assize of mort d'ancestre, even though the putative father was "beyond the seas" preceding and during
pregnancy and could not possibly have been the father).
11. See Pendrell v. Pendrell, (1732) 93 Eng. Rep. 945, 945 (K.B.); Bosvile v. Attorney Gen.,
(1887) 12 P.D. 177, 183.
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The stigma and penalties of being illegitimately born were strong in
the common law, and such penalties persisted in the United States in state
common law and statutory codes until the 1960s. 12 A series of Supreme
Court decisions in the late 1960s and early 1970s rendered many of those
state laws unconstitutional. 13 The logic underlying these decisions was a
simple one: penalizing children who have no power over the circumstances
of their birth is both "illogical and unjust."' 14 Thus the Court, through these
decisions, exorcised at least the legal stigma attached to illegitimacy that
had been used throughout the ages as a means of social condemnation of
nonmarital relationships. More immediately, the decisions required states
possessing laws establishing different legal status for legitimate and ille-
gitimate children to develop new statutes.
15
In response to the Supreme Court's rulings, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed the Uniform Parentage
Act of 1973, which became the first uniform act defining parentage to be
adopted by a substantial number of states. 16 The proposed Act represented
a revolutionary step forward by the Conference, proposing substantive
legal equality for all children, regardless of the marital status of their par-
ents. 17 This stood in stark contrast to the then-current laws of many of the
states, which treated very differently those children born in wedlock and
12. See Harry D, Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477 (1967).
Dealing with the legal status of children born outside of the traditional marital relationship between a
man and a woman was the subject of recurrent efforts throughout the twentieth century by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) prefatory note,
9B U.L.A. at 378. The Uniform Illegitimacy Act of 1922, the Blood Tests to Determine Paternity Act of
1952, the Uniform Paternity Act of 1960, and various provisions of the Uniform Probate Code of 1969
were all efforts to define the legal status of children born outside of state-sanctioned wedlock. Id.
However, the Uniform Illegitimacy Act was withdrawn by the Conference, and few of the other pro-
posed acts were adopted by the various states. Id.
13. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the Supreme Court struck down the Louisiana
statutory scheme, holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permitted the
Court to strike down all discriminatory laws relating to the status of a child's birth where such a classi-
fication serves no state interest, compelling or otherwise. 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972). In Gomez v. Perez,
the Court found a Texas law preventing illegitimate children from claiming child support unconstitu-
tional, holding that "there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying ... an essential right
to a child simply because its natural father has not married its mother." 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
14. Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538 (citing Weber, 406 U.S. at 175).
15. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) prefatory note, 9B U.L.A. 378 ("[T]the states need new
legislation on this subject because the bulk of current [1973] law on the subject of children born out of
wedlock is either unconstitutional or subject to grave constitutional doubt.").
16. The Uniform Parentage Act had its origins in a 1969 article by Professor Harry D. Krause of
the University of Illinois College of Law, entitled "A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy." Id. The
Act has been adopted by Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Wash-
ington, and Wyoming. Id. at 377 tbl. Rhode Island has adopted major provisions of both the Uniform
Paternity Act of 1960 and the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 into its code. Id. at 377 n. 1.
17. Id. at 378-79.
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those born to unwed parents. 18 A further important social aim of the Act
was the improvement and regularizing of state laws and mechanisms that
enforce obligations of financial support for children. 19 Importantly, the Act
also provided a series of definitions of "parenthood" that expanded and
refined the three common law definitions of giving birth, marriage to the
mother, or acknowledgment by the father.
To establish paternity, the Act established a series of rebuttable pre-
sumptions (collected from various state laws used to establish "legiti-
macy") for use in cases where the external circumstances indicate that a
particular individual is possibly the father. 20 These presumptions arose
from circumstances such as whether the presumed father was married to or
attempted to marry the woman at the time the child was conceived, and
whether the presumed father had taken the child into his home and held it
out to the world as his own.21
The Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 was embraced, with variations,
by more than a quarter of the states, but differing interpretations of the
adopted Act by various state courts led to inconsistencies in the Act's ap-
plication. 22 Furthermore, the explosive development and widespread appli-
cation of scientific technology, both for the identification of putative
fathers via DNA technology and for assisting in conception and carrying a
child to term, necessitated revision of the Act of 1973.23 The Uniform Par-
entage Act of 2000 (amended in 2002) was just such an attempt. The most
significant changes in the Act of 2000 were the incorporation of new scien-
18. Id. at 378.
19. Id. at 380.
20. The relevant section states:
The father-child relationship is established between a man and a child by: (1) an unrebutted
presumption of the man's paternity of the child under Section 204; (2) an effective acknowl-
edgment of paternity by the man under [Article] 3, unless the acknowledgment has been re-
scinded or successfully challenged; (3) an adjudication of the man's paternity; (4) adoption of
the child by the man; [or] (5) the man's having consented to assisted reproduction by a
woman under [Article] 7 which resulted in the birth of the child[; or (6) an adjudication con-
firming the man as a parent of a child born to a gestational mother if the agreement was vali-
dated under [Article] 8 or is enforceable under other law].
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201, 9B U.L.A. 299, 309 (2001).
21. Id. § 4(a)(1)-(4), 9B ULA. 394-94.
22. Omissions in the Act, or its derivative statutes, have led to courts in different states arriving at
very different conclusions when faced with cases containing similar facts. The courts in California, for
example, have held that an unmarried man lacks standing to sue an intact family in order to establish
parental rights. Courts in Texas and Colorado, however, arrived at the opposite conclusion. Id. at prefa-
tory note, 9B U.L.A. 297.
23. An additional problem requiring legal address was the widespread adoption in the 1990s of
assisted reproduction and "gestational agreements" in association with the advent of surrogate child-
birth, neither of which was addressed by the Act. Revision of the Act of 1973 was undoubtedly neces-
sary to keep up with a society that was becoming increasingly sophisticated with respect to reproductive
technology. Id.
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tific advances, principally DNA technology, to identify parents in cases
where such identification is circumstantially in doubt.24 Similarly, the Act
no longer recognizes "natural parents"; instead, the Act adopts the term
"genetic parent" as being less ambiguous.25 The Act's authors also ex-
panded it to employ new sections recognizing voluntary acknowledgements
of paternity, registry of paternity, genetic testing as a means of establishing
paternity, the status of children of assisted reproduction, and gestational
agreements.26 As such, the 2000 revision represented a significant and
much needed expansion of the Act of 1973.27 However, most of those
states that have adopted a version of the Uniform Parentage Act are still
employing the Act of 1973. As a result, many states not only adhere to the
older, traditional criteria of establishing paternity under the various rebut-
table presumptions, but these states are also ill-equipped to address ques-
tions posed by emerging reproductive technologies and changing societal
attitudes about families.
One pressing need unfulfilled by any version of the Uniform Parent-
age Act is the further development of the legal definition of the term "par-
ent" to comprehensively encompass the caregivers in same-sex
relationships, both male and female. Although the prospect of gay marriage
was given a serious, though not necessarily fatal, setback in the elections of
November 2004 (in which the electorate of eleven states approved state
constitutional amendments prescribing marriage as an exclusively hetero-
sexual institution) 28, the increasing use of reproductive technologies and
relaxed adoption laws have resulted in rapidly increasing numbers of fami-
lies with same-sex parents.29 As with traditional, heterosexual families,
many homosexual relationships are likely to fail, leaving the questions of
parenthood, custody, and duties of support in a legal vacuum that courts
must struggle to fill.
The states have been slow to accept the Act of 2000; so far only four
states have adopted it.30 At the same time, new developments in reproduc-
24. See, e.g., id. § 501, 9B U.L.A. 329.
25. See, e.g., id. § 102(3), 9B U.L.A. 303 (referring to a "genetic father").
26. Seegenerally id. §§ 301,401,501,701,801,901, 9B U.L.A. 313,321,329, 354, 362, 371.
27. However, the Act of 2000 has been adopted, with variations, by only four states including
Delaware, which repealed its adoption of the Act of 1973 and adopted the amended Act of 2000 in its
stead in 2004. Id. at 9B U.L.A. 4 tbl. (Supp. 2005).
28. Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Ohio, Utah, and Oregon all adopted state constitutional amendments defining marriage as exclusively
being between one man and one woman. See Stevenson Swanson, Amendments to Ban Practice Pass
Handily in All 11 States, CHI. TRIB. Nov. 3, 2004, at 8.
29. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2, at 2 tbl.1 (comparing numbers of household types
and sex of householder).
30. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000), 9B U.L.A. 4 tbl. (Supp. 2005).
2006)
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tive technologies and social arrangements, including in vitro fertilization
and surrogate parenthood, have posed serious problems for the state courts
in the determination of parentage. 31 The result has been a welter of confu-
sion and inconsistency. At one end of the spectrum, some state courts have
held that the mother is the woman who gives birth to a child (the gesta-
tional mother), and that no other person can possess that legal status at the
same time.32 A number of surrogacy cases, however, have established that
the genetic mother (the woman from whose ovum the child is conceived) is
the true "mother" and has superior rights over the gestational mother. 33 At
the same time, some states have acknowledged that individuals who have
collaborated in bringing a child into the world and who have acted in a
parental role through the child's early life are "de facto parents" and as-
sume full parental rights and obligations. 34 Other courts have flatly rejected
that concept and rely strictly on biological and statutory definitions.35 In
some states, such as California, attempts to take a middle ground, such as
applying the Uniform Parentage Act in a gender-blind manner, have re-
sulted in contradictory results in highly similar cases. 36 Part II of this Note
presents some of these disparate approaches to the definition of parenthood.
II. PARENTHOOD IN CALIFORNIA: GENETICS, INTENTIONALITY AND THE
"GENDER-NEUTRAL" APPROACH TO THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT.
A. Identifying the Tension: Two Inconsistent Results
Two cases currently before the California Supreme Court, K.M. v.
E.G. and Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R, directly confront the challenges
posed by emergent reproductive technologies and changing societal atti-
tudes. 37 At the heart of both of these cases are two questions that the courts
must resolve: First, can a same-sex partner who has filled a parental role in
the child's life be a legal parent if she is genetically unrelated to the child?
Second, are the demonstrated intentions of the mother and the same-sex
partner to act as parents, both before and after birth, sufficient criteria to
support a legal definition of parentage?
31. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136 (2004).
32. See, e.g., In re Thompson,Il S.W.3d 913, 918 (Tenn. 1999).
33. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
34. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M, 711 N.E.2d 886, 892-93 (Mass. 1999).
35. See, e.g., Thompson, 11 S.W.3d at 919.
36. Compare K.M., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 153, with Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R., 16 Cal. Rptr.
3d 123, 145-46 (Ct. App. 2004).
37. KM., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136; Kristine Renee H., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123.
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KM v. E.G. illustrates one approach to addressing these challenges.
K.M. and E.G. were lesbian registered partners living in California. 38 K.M.
donated her ova, fertilized by sperm from an anonymous donor, to E.G. so
that E.G. could conceive a child.39 Prior to the in vitro procedure, K.M. was
required to sign a standardized, complex donor release form of the sort
generally required of sperm donors and without which the procedure could
not proceed; in signing the form, K.M. waived her parental rights to the
products of the in vitro fertilization. 40 In due course, E.G. gave birth to
twins, who were genetically unrelated to her even though she had carried
them to term.4 1 The twins were the genetic children of K.M.42 The couple
raised the children as co-parents for five years, although for a portion of
that time K.M.'s identity as their genetic mother was concealed from the
twins and the community. 43 When the twins went to school, both K.M. and
E.G. were listed as parents, and K.M. represented herself to the twins as a
parent. 44 When the children asked the partners why they did not have a
father, K.M. and E.G. told them, "Aren't you lucky you have two ma-
mas?" 45 Eventually, the relationship between K.M. and E.G. came to an
end, and E.G. moved to Massachusetts, taking the children with her and
denying K.M.'s requests for joint custody and visitation rights.46 K.M. filed
a Petition to Establish Parental Rights in the California courts to establish
her identity as parent and to obtain visitation rights.47 The trial court con-
cluded that K.M. was not a legal parent because she relinquished any rights
she might have had by signing the consent form.48
On appeal, the Appellate Court for the First District of California
found that K.M. did have standing to bring action under the California
Family Code; but the court agreed that K.M.'s alleged oral agreement with
E.G. and her signing of the consent form indicated that the K.M. did not
38. K.M., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3dat 139.
39. Id. at 141.
40. Id. at 140. The California Business and Professions Code requires that "[a] physician and
surgeon who removes sperm or ova from a patient shall, before the sperm or ova are used for a purpose
other than reimplantation in the same patient or implantation in the spouse of the patient, obtain the
written consent of the patient as provided in [a different subdivision]." CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE





45. Appellant's Petition for Review, K.M. 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136 (No. S125643), 2004 WL
2108127, at *12 (June 18, 2004).
46. K.M., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 142.
47. Id. E.G. responded to the petition by filing a motion to quash K.M.'s petition. The trial court
determined that K.M. lacked standing to bring an action to determine parentage. Id. at 143.
48. Id. at 143.
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intend to become a parent at the time of conception.49 In so holding, the
court relied on a decision of the California Supreme Court in a childbirth
surrogacy case, Johnson v. Calvert, which established an "intentionality"
test, looking to the putative parent's stated intent to act as a parent at the
time of fertilization. 50 However, the facts in Johnson were dissimilar to
those in KM The Calverts, a husband and wife, contracted with a woman,
Anna Johnson, to act as a surrogate. 51 Johnson was impregnated with an
ovum from the wife that had been fertilized in vitro by sperm from the
husband, and Johnson successfully carried the child to term. 52 Relations
between the Calverts and Johnson deteriorated, however, and both sides
filed actions seeking a declaration that they were the natural parents of the
child.53 The trial court ruled that the Calverts were the child's "genetic,
biological and natural" parents and that Johnson had no parental rights; the
surrogacy contract was thus enforceable against her claims.54 The Court of
Appeal for the Fourth District affirmed, and Johnson appealed to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, which ruled for the Calverts and established the
intentionality test as determinative of parentage in cases with competing
maternal claims. 55
The intentionality test looks to the behavior and expressed intentions
of the parties at the time of the child's conception. 56 The Johnson court
observed that "[w]ithin the context of artificial reproductive techniques...
intentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-for
ought presumptively to determine legal parenthood. '57 Notably, the inten-
tionality test looks only to the party's intentions prior to and at the time of
conception and not thereafter.58 According to the court in K.M v. E.G.,
K.M.'s alleged oral agreement with E.G. prior to the twins' conception, in
which K.M. and E.G. agreed that E.G. would be the parent of any child
conceived until the parties undertook formal adoption proceedings, and
K.M.'s signing of the donor form were determinative that K.M. did not
intend to be a parent of the child.59 Although the court acknowledged that
49. Id. at 144, 147. The California Family Code is an adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act of
1973. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) prefatory note (amended 2000), 9B U.L.A. 377 tbl. (2001).
50. K.M., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 150 (citing Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993)).




55. Id. at 782.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 783 (quoting Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WiS. L. REv. 297, 323 (1990)).
58. See id. at 782-83.
59. K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 149-50 (Ct. App. 2004).
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K.M.'s genetic relatedness to the twins gave her a claim to parenthood
under one definition contained in the statute, her claim to a maternal link
was necessarily competitive with that of E.G.60 The court quoted Johnson
in asserting that "California law recognizes only one natural mother, de-
spite advances in reproductive technology rendering a different outcome
biologically possible."'61 Thus, although the California code includes more
than one legal definition of motherhood, the court held that when such
claims compete, the Johnson intentionality test is applied.62 Ironically, the
application of the intentionality test in Johnson favored the genetic mother
over the gestational mother, whereas in applying the same test in K.M. the
court favored the gestational over the genetic mother.63
The court finally declined to base its analysis on the best interests of
the children, although it acknowledged the harsh results of its ruling for the
twins.64 Review of this case has been granted by the California Supreme
Court. 6 5
In a contemporaneous case that parallels KM, the lesbian partner of a
gestational mother (both were genetically unrelated to the child) was found
to have standing to establish parentage under the presumed father provision
of the California Family Code.66 To reach this conclusion, the Appellate
Court of the Second District in Kristine Renee H. interpreted the statute in a
gender-neutral manner, as mandated by section 7650 of the California Fam-
ily Code.67 Under section 7611 (d), parentage can be established if (in lan-
guage reverting to the ancient common law) Lisa (the nongestational
partner) had (1) received the child into her own home, and (2) held out the
child as her own.68 The Kristine Renee H. court, unlike the court in KM.,
expressly declined to apply the "intentionality" standard from Johnson,
although it found that the intentionality standard buttressed its result.69 The
60. Id. at 151-52.
61. Id. at 144.
62. Id. at 152. See also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (West 2003) (establishing that parenthood may
be established by a mother giving birth to a child); id. § 8512 (defining "birth parent" as including the
"biological parent" but not differentiating between genetic or gestational relationships). Furthermore,
section 7650 states that definitions establishing the existence of a parental relationship must be applied
in a gender-neutral manner, indicating that definitions used to establish paternity can also be used to
establish maternity. Id. § 7650 ("Insofar as practicable, the provisions of this part applicable to the
father and child relationship apply.").
63. See KM., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 151-52; Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
64. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3dat 154.
65. M.K. v. E.G., 97 P.3d 72 (2004).
66. Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 144 (Ct. App. 2004).
67. Id. at 134-35.
68. Id. at 143 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (d) (West 2003)).
69. Id. at 144-45.
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Kristine Renee H. court's gender-neutral reading of the California Family
Code, however, might have led to a considerably different outcome in KM
The genetic identity of K.M. as a parent was not in dispute, thus establish-
ing her as a "biological parent. '' 70 Furthermore, like Lisa, K.M. had argua-
bly met the standard of paternity by taking the child into her home and
holding it out to the world as her own.
71
The Appellate Courts of the Second and Fourth Districts have thus ar-
rived at opposite conclusions in Kristine Renee H. and KM by applying
two different tests: "holding out the child" versus "intentionality." At the
heart of both of these cases are two fundamental issues with which the
California courts are attempting to come to terms: First, can a nonadoptive
domestic partner of a birth mother be a legal parent if she is biologically
unrelated (or even if she is genetically related) to the child? Second, is the
intentionality test developed in Johnson v. Calvert a workable approach in
resolving issues of parenthood?
Over time, the answer to the first question has perceptibly changed in
California. The landmark case upholding a negative answer is Curiale v.
Reagan.72 In this case, a lesbian couple, Angela Curiale and Robin Reagan,
agreed to have a child via artificial insemination and to raise the child to-
gether. 73 The child was born to Reagan in June 1985, and the couple raised
child together for over two years, during which Curiale not only acted as
parent but was also the sole financial provider for the family.74 The rela-
tionship ended in 1987, and in June 1988 Reagan informed Curiale that she
would no longer share custody or allow visitation.75 The trial court refused
to give effect to the prior agreement between Curiale and Reagan, stating
that Curiale had no statutory basis on which to claim parental status. 76 The
court found that "[t]he Legislature has not conferred upon one in plaintiffs
position, a nonparent in a same-sex bilateral relationship, any right of cus-
tody or visitation upon the termination of the relationship," and the court
declined to act further. 77 This finding has acted as precedent for a number
of cases in the California courts, including K.M
78
70. K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 144 (Ct. App. 2004).
71. Id. at 141.
72. 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1990).
73. Id. at 521.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 522.
77. Id.
78. The court in K.M. stated that "[t]he appellate courts have consistently held that he domestic
partner of a child's natural parent does not qualify as a parent under the UPA despite the parental role
the partner played in the life of the child." K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 152 (Ct. App. 2004).
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The Curiale decision and its progeny stand in marked contrast to the
reasoning of the California Supreme Court's decision in In re Nicholas H.
79
In Nicholas H., a man acted as a parent (and was listed as father on the
child's birth certificate) of a child born to a woman the man lived with,
even though the man knowingly was not the child's biological parent.
80
The court held that the man had established parental rights under the Cali-
fornia Family Code.81 The court reasoned that the father's taking of the
child into his own home and openly holding out the child as his own were
sufficient to meet the presumptive definition of parenthood under section
761 l(d).82 Although the court emphasized that in this case rebutting the
presumption of paternity would leave the boy effectively fatherless (the
identity of the biological father had never been judicially established), the
decision clearly established a legal definition of parenthood for non-
biologically related individuals who act as parents to a child in a family
setting. 83
These California decisions have resulted in conflicting approaches to
determining the rights of domestic partners to claim parenthood arising
from historically parallel sets of decisions. One set of decisions, including
Curiale and K.M., states that a non-biologically related individual who acts
as a parent to a child in a family unit cannot be a parent regardless of the
pre- and postpartum role played by that individual. The other approach,
originating in Nicholas H. and extended to Kristine Renee H., states that the
actions played in raising the child, specifically, taking the child into the
home and holding the child out to the world as that individual's own, are
sufficient to establish, and are determinative of, parenthood. It may be sig-
nificant that the families involved in both Nicholas H. and Karen C. were a
heterosexual couple and a single parent (presumably also heterosexual),
respectively.84 Both situations might well be considered more "traditional"
forms of families, with which the courts might be more comfortable in
establishing and defining parental roles. However in Kristine Renee H., the
court extended the reasoning of Nicholas H. and Karen C. to determina-
tions of parenthood involving lesbian couples. 85 There, the court rejected
the Curiale court's reasoning because the Curiale court failed to interpret
79. 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002).
80. Id. at 935.
81. Id. at937.
82. Id. at 938.
83. Id. at 933-34. Notably, in In re Karen C, the Court of Appeal for the Second District held that
the "holding out the child as his own" presumptive test for parenthood employed in Nicholas H. must
be applied equally to women and to men. 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 681 (Ct. App. 2002).
84. Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 678; Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 935.
85. Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 142-43 (Ct. App. 2004).
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the California Family Code's language in the gender-neutral manner re-
quired by California Family Code section 7650 when establishing a parent-
child relationship.86
The extension of the presumption of paternity established by "holding
out the child" in Kristine Renee H. was a bold step, and it remains to be
seen whether this extension will be sustainable on appeal to the California
Supreme Court. 87 This extension takes a test that was intended originally
only to determine paternity by means other than genetic testing or cohabita-
tion at the time of conception and birth, and applies that test in order to
grant parental rights to partners who filled parental roles in the family but
were otherwise unrelated to the child, and in order to sustain those roles
after the family unit had disintegrated. Furthermore, this extension grants
presumptive parental rights to individuals who, like the plaintiff in Kristine
Renee H., are not only genetically unrelated to the child, but who could not
be related under any circumstances. 8
8
Given this line of reasoning, the decision reached in K.M is surprising
and appears to represent a step backwards toward the decision reached in
Curiale. In KM., the genetically related party was not the woman who
gave birth to the twins, but rather the donor of the ova; thus, the donor
more closely related genetically to the twins than was E.G., who gave birth
to the twins and was determined to be the children's only parent.89 Under
the tests described in California Family Code section 7611, the genetic
relatedness of K.M., which neither party contested, should be sufficient in
itself to establish a presumption of parenthood. 90 If the courts of California
are going to interpret paternity as a gender-neutral concept, as they did in
Kristine Renee H.,91 consistency demands that they likewise define mater-
nity in a gender-neutral manner. Although the court placed considerable
emphasis on the fact that K.M. signed a complex, three page consent form
waiving parental rights prior to the harvesting of her ova, signing such a
form was mandatory before the procedure could begin.92 Furthermore, her
86. Id. at 137.
87. In August 2005, the Supreme Court reversed the holding of the California Court of Appeals
and held that the gestational mother was estopped from challenging the agreement assigning parental
rights to both partners to which she had earlier stipulated. Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R., 117 P.3d
690 (Cal. 2004).
88. Lisa had not donated the ovum that resulted in the child and, of course, was incapable of
donating the required sperm. Even with current technology, it remains practically impossible for two
women to be equally genetically related to an offspring; that still requires one sperm and one ovum.
89. K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 150 (Ct. App. 2004).
90. Id. at 144.
91. Kristine Renee H., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 137.
92. Appellant's Petition for Review, KM. 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136 (No. S125643), 2004 WL
2108127, at *8-*9 (Cal. June 18, 2004).
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active participation in the pregnancy and birth and her behavior in acting as
parent for over five years after the children were born would certainly seem
to satisfy the requirements for "taking into the home" and "holding out to
the world" 93 that are the essence of section 7611 (d). However, the K.M.
court based its decision mainly on Johnson v. Calvert and its "intentional-
ity" test.
94
B. Massachusetts: The "De Facto Parent"
When confronted with the complex issue of defining "parent" in such
cases, not all states employ the same analytical approach as the California
court in K.M. Massachusetts, for example, employs a broader standard in
defining "parent" by examining the role played by the adult partner in the
life of the child, both before and after birth. A case with similar factual
circumstances to California's K.M. and Kristine Renee H. was E.N.O. v.
L.MM, which was tried before the Supreme Judicial Court in 1999.95 The
parties (individually "E" and "L") shared a committed, monogamous, les-
bian relationship for thirteen years, during which they availed themselves
of every legal mechanism available to signify the permanence of their rela-
tionship as life partners. 96 Throughout the course of their relationship, both
parties intended to become parents of a child together, and in 1994 L be-
came pregnant via artificial insemination with sperm provided by an
anonymous donor.97 Before the birth of the child, L and E executed a co-
parenting agreement in which they agreed to share responsibilities for rais-
ing the child. 98 The agreement further specified that both parties would
retain parental status in the event that the relationship ultimately dis-
solved. 99 After the birth of the child, E was the principal source of income
for the family and acted as primary caregiver to the child for seven months
93. K.M., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3dat 141.
94. Id. at 153.
95. 711 N.E.2d 886 (1999). Massachusetts has not adopted either the 1973 or 2000 versions of the
Uniform Parentage Act. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), 9B U.L.A. 377 tbl. (2001); UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT (2000), 9B U.L.A. 4 tbl. (supp. 2005).
96. E.N.O., 711N.E. 2dat888.
97. Id. Both individuals were party to the decision and process by which L became pregnant, and
E cared for her partner throughout a difficult pregnancy, accompanying her to every doctor's appoint-
ment. When the child was born in 1995, E was present at the delivery and cut the child's umbilical cord.
The parties sent out birth announcements identifying both L and E as the child's parents and the child's
family name was a conjunction of both partner's surnames. Id. at 888-89.
98. Id. at 889.
99. Id.
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when L experienced medical complications.' 00 The child referred to both E
and L as his parents. 101
In 1998 E consulted an attorney about initiating adoption proceedings,
but shortly thereafter the relationship between the two women began to
crumble. 102 The couple separated in May of 1998, and L refused to allow E
to have any access to the child. 103 In June 1998, E filed a complaint seeking
specific performance of the couple's earlier coparenting agreement, permit-
ting E to adopt the three-year-old child and establishing joint legal cus-
tody. 104 E further sought to establish a visitation schedule with the child
and to diminish her obligations as primary source of income to L and the
child. 105
Following a hearing in probate court, the judge ordered temporary
visitation rights for E pending trial. 106 L appealed the decision to Supreme
Judicial Court, arguing that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to award
temporary visitation rights to E. 107 L further argued that there was no statu-
tory authority permitting visitation to one who, though standing in the posi-
tion of a parent, is not a natural parent of a child.108 The court, however,
held that the probate court did indeed have jurisdiction, and then the court
determined whether such visitation was in the best interests of the child. 109
The court began its analysis by declaring that "[a] child may be a
member of a nontraditional family in which he is parented by a legal parent
and a de facto parent."1 10 The court defined a "de facto parent" as
one who has no biological relation to the child, but has participated in the
child's life as a member of the child's family. The de facto parent resides







106. Id. In doing so, the judge applied the "best interests of the child" standard. Although some-
what amorphous, in this particular case the judge looked specifically to the fact that the decision to
conceive and raise the child was mutual between the parties, that after birth E had acted daily in the
capacity of a parent in all aspects of the child's life, that both parties had at all times referred to each
other as the child's parent in the child's presence and that both were listed as parents on all school and
health records of the child. The judge further relied on the report of the child's guardian ad litem, who
reported that E "was an active parent and appreciative of the child's needs" and that "both mothers were
clearly involved in the child's upbringing." Id. at 889-90.
107. Id. at 888.
108. Id. at 889.
109. Id. at 890, 893.
110. Id.at891.
[Vol 81:773
"AREN'T YOU LUCKY YOU HAVE TWO MAMAS?"
ent, performs a share of caretaking functions at least as great as the legal
parent. 1 1'
Additionally, the de facto parent "shapes the child's daily routine, ad-
dresses developmental needs, disciplines the child, provides for his educa-
tion and medical care, and serves as a moral guide."'
' 12
The court recognized that nontraditional families are becoming an in-
creasingly common part of the American familial landscape; same-sex
couples are deciding to have children in increasing numbers, and the chil-
dren of these relationships naturally form parental relationships with both
partners, regardless of whether the parents are legal or de facto.' 13 In cases
where such nontraditional families dissolve, according to the court, the best
interests of the child must be determined by examining the nature of the
relationships between the child and both parental figures.
1 1 4
A mere assertion of devotion to the child by the putative de facto par-
ent is not sufficient to determine parental status.1 15 The court used the facts
from a previous case, C.C. v. A.B., to outline the factual elements sufficient
to establish de facto parental status.1 16 In C.C., a man who had lived in an
unmarried state with a woman was granted standing to maintain a paternity
action after the relationship dissolved because he had demonstrated a sub-
stantial parent-child relationship, despite the fact that at the time of concep-
tion and birth the woman was married to another man. 117 The mother
admitted that the plaintiff might be the father of the child ' 1 8 The plaintiff s
name was listed as parent on the child's birth and baptismal certificates. 119
After the child was born, they all lived together as a family, and the plain-
tiff demonstrated an interest in continuing his relationship with the child.12 0
In contradistinction, the court held in C.M v. P.R. that a man who had lived
with a woman during her pregnancy for several months before the child
was born could not maintain a paternity action because he had not been part












121. Id. (citing C.M. v. P.R., 649 N.E.2d 154 (Mass. 1995)).
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In E.N. 0., the court found that all of the facts of the case supported the
conclusion that E was a de facto parent of the child. 122 E had been a part of
the decision to conceive the child, had attended doctor's appointments and
workshops together with L, and had participated in the birth of the child as
a father would. 123 E was listed on the birth announcements as a parent and
contributed her last name as part of the child's last name. 124 All of these
facts manifested the intent of E and L to have a child and form a family
together.125 The parties further reinforced their commitment to parent the
child together by executing and re-executing the coparenting agreement, in
which they indicated their belief that the child would continue his relation-
ship with E should the relationship between E and L come to an end. 126 E
had resided with the child and L as a family, and E participated in the rais-
ing of the child in all respects as a de facto parent. 127 Furthermore, E pro-
vided financial support for the child and assumed primary care for the child
during the course of L's illness.128 The child was manifestly attached to E,
calling her "Mommy" and telling people that he had two mothers. 129 In
view of the established relationship between E and the child, the court held
that the probate court judge had not erred in determining that temporary
visitation rights with his de facto parent, E, would be in the child's best
interests. 130
The contrast between the Massachusetts and California cases is strong,
but some philosophical lines link the two. The more conservative strain of
California law, as illustrated in K.M., emphasizes the parties' intentions at
the beginning of the pregnancy alone and refuses to adopt the "best inter-
ests of the child" standard that Massachusetts uses as a baseline for its "de
facto parent" determination. 131 In K.M., the relationship of the non-
gestational mother and child after birth is immaterial; the approach relies
solely on the demonstrated intentionality at the commencement of the
pregnancy. 132 The other approach, employed by the California court in
Kristine Renee H., of "taking the child into [her] home and holding it out to
the world as [her] own," is closer to that of Massachusetts-although the
122. Id. at 892-93.






129. Id. at 892-93.
130. Id. at 894.
131. See K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 154 (Ct. App. 2004).
132. Id. at 151.
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court in Kristine Renee H. did not directly address the best interests of the
child, it did so indirectly by examining the non-biological partner's behav-
ior.133 Both the Massachusetts approach and the California approach em-
ployed in Kristine Renee H. have the advantage of protecting children
living in de facto families with same-sex adult partners from being summa-
rily deprived of a relationship with someone whom they have known and
depended on, from their earliest moments, as a parent.
C. Delaware: Parental Relationships and Obligations
Parenthood, of course, establishes not only legal rights, but legal obli-
gations as well. Can the legal obligations of parenthood traditionally im-
posed on biological parents also be imposed on the person who acts as a de
facto parent but who has no biological or adoptive relationship to the child?
The cases described above have revolved principally around definitions of
parenthood designed to establish or deny rights of visitation to estranged,
same-sex partners who have acted as parental figures. Delaware, however,
has established that participation by a non-biologically related same-sex
partner in conception and birth not only establishes rights to visitation but
also may compel an obligation of financial support from the non-
biologically related partner. 134
In Chambers v. Chambers, a lesbian couple, Carol and Karen Cham-
bers, maintained a committed relationship for three years. 135 A son, David,
was born in August 1996 following an in vitro fertilization, but Carol and
Karen separated nine months later. 136 In August 1999, Carol filed a Petition
for Visitation in the Family Court of Delaware, in which she referred to
David as her "son from infetro [sic]," and in a contemporaneous Motion for
Temporary Visitation she stated that "David knows me as his other
mother."'137 The following February the court approved a permanent visita-
tion schedule between Carol and David. 138
133. Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 144 (Ct. App. 2004). The advantage of
"intentionality" as evidenced by behavior as a standard over "best interests of the child" is the unpre-
dictability of the latter standard. In cases where there is no clear-cut choice (as, for instance, between an
abusive and non-abusive partner) the decision may rely on stereotyped notions or prejudices, financial
considerations, or other criteria not strictly related to the child's emotional welfare.
134. See Chambers v. Chambers, No. CNOO-09493, 2002 WL 1940145 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 5,
2002). All of the names in the case are pseudonymous. Id. at *1 n. 1.
135. Id. at *1. The couple held a commitment ceremony and Karen legally changed her surname to
that of Carol's. Some months after deciding to live together, Karen underwent an in vitro fertilization
procedure with sperm provided by an anonymous donor. Carol helped to finance the fertilization proce-






Although she had been granted visitation rights by the court, Carol re-
fused to pay child support to Karen. 139 In March of 2000, Karen filed a
petition with the Family Court of Delaware seeking financial support for
David. 140 Attempts to mediate a settlement failed, and the court determined
that it had subject matter jurisdiction as a case of first impression.141
In ruling on Karen's motion for summary judgment, the court first
looked to the Delaware child support statute and the Delaware Parentage
Act for a definition of "parent."' 142 Although the child support statute is
specific regarding the obligations of parents, wed or unwed, to provide
financial support for their minor children, it does not provide a precise
definition of the term "parent."' 143 Because the legislature failed to provide
a definition of "parent," the court was left to provide its own definition. 144
Carol argued that because she was not biologically related to David and
had not adopted him, it would be "absurd" for the court to find that the
parent of a child is anything other than "a child's mother or father."'
45
Karen, on the other hand, urged the court to adopt a broader definition of
parent that was more liberal and less traditional than that advanced by
Carol, which recognized parenthood only as established by biological or
adoptive ties. 146
The court rejected Carol's contention that the tests established by the
Delaware Parentage Act were the exclusive means by which paternity
might be established. 147 According to the court, the Act is not the exclusive
means of determining paternity, and thus, by extension, neither can it be the
exclusive means by which maternity is determined. 148 Furthermore, the
language of the statute, which does not explicitly restrict the parent and
child relationship to one mother and one father, does not necessarily pre-
clude an interpretation of "parent and child relationship" from including





143. Id. at *2. The Delaware Parentage Act is Delaware's adopted version of the Uniform Parent-
age Act of 2000. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000), 9B U.L.A. 4 tbl. (supp. 2005).
144. Chambers, 2002 WL 1940145, at *2.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *4.
148. Id. at *6.
149. Id. at *5. The Delaware Code defines "parent-and-child relationship" to mean, "the legal
relationship existing between a child and his or her natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law
confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties and obligations. It includes the mother-and-child relation-
ship and the father-and-child relationship." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 801 (1999). Furthermore, the
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equally reasonably include two "mother and child" relationships in the
same family. 150
In the absence of a legislative definition of "parent," the court initially
looked to the definition provided by the dictionary, which, among other
definitions, defines "parent" as "one who procreates, begets or brings forth
offspring."' 151 The court then looked to Carol's behavior as an indicator of
her intentions. In her actions to obtain visitation rights, Carol had identified
herself as the child's "mother," despite the fact that she was neither the
gestational mother of nor genetically related to David. 152 Her financial
contribution to the in vitro procedure further established her critical role in
bringing the child into the world.153 The court recognized that societal
changes, including the increasing numbers of children living in non-
traditional families, allowed for expanding traditional definitions of what is
meant by "parent" in the absence of either a statutory definition or clear
indication of legislative intent.154 Having weighed what little authority it
could find on the matter, the court rejected Carol's narrow definition of
"parent," which rested solely on biological or adoptive grounds. 155 Rather,
the court held that one whose acts had "certainly brought forth these off-
spring as if done biologically" is one "to whom responsibility attaches."']56
The court determined that Carol's actions in helping to bring David into the
world and her arguing that she was his mother in obtaining visitation rights
were compelling facts and circumstances demanding a "conclusion that she
be considered David's mother for child support purposes."' 157
Finally, the court also looked to the public policy implications of its
decision. Had the court adopted the more narrow definition of parenthood
espoused by Carol, David might well have been thrown into poverty. 158
Given the rapid rise in the numbers of nontraditional families headed by
gay and lesbian partners, the court argued that it could never have been the
intent of the Delaware General Assembly to allow a child to be forced into
Code also states, "The parent-and-child relationship between a child and: (1) The natural mother may be
established by proof of her having given birth to the child, or in accordance with this title." Id. § 801.
150. Chambers, 2002 WL 1940145, at *5.
151. Id. at *2 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (4th ed. 1968)).
152. Id. at*10.
153. Id. at *3.
154. Id. at *5 (citing Carol Buell, Legal Issues Affecting Alternative Families: A Therapist's
Primer, in GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTING 75 (Deborah F. Glazer & Jack Drescher eds., 2001)).
155. Id. at *4.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *4.
158. Id. at *5. Karen had been unable to work since before David's birth due to a disability. Id.
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poverty under the facts of the Chambers case. 159 The court instead stated
that it was much more likely that the Assembly would have intended that
one who had "acted in tandem with her committed life partner to bring an
infant into this world, [would be expected] to support him as his 'par-
ent.'" 160
The court's definitions of parental obligations in this case, although
not explicitly stated, are perhaps the most dramatically liberal of all consid-
ered in this Note so far. California's intentionality test and the Massachu-
setts de facto parent definition both look to the intention of a putative
parent to bring a child into the world, but they both also look to the activi-
ties of the individual in playing a role in the life of the growing child. 161
The Kristine Renee H. case in California emphasized the non-gestational
partner's role in taking the child into her home and. holding it out to the
world as her own. 162 E.N.O. in Massachusetts similarly emphasized the
strong parental role played by the non-gestational partner in the life of the
growing child. 163 In Chambers, the Delaware court paid very little attention
to the emotional relationship of either adult partner to the child in defining
Carol's parental obligation to pay child support. 164 Indeed, the court was
highly critical of Carol for disingenuously holding herself out as David's
"other mother" when attempting to establish rights to visitation, but then
holding forth a much narrower definition of parent when attempting to
avoid paying child support. 165 The critical factor on which the Delaware
court focused was Carol's participation, both financial and by signing the
forms, in the in vitro procedure by which David was conceived. 166 The
court effectually equated this with the natural method by which children are
conceived, stating that without Carol's participation, the child might never
have been brought into the world. 167 According to the Delaware court, acts
by an individual that intentionally and materially assist in the conception of
a child may be sufficient to establish that individual as a parent. 168
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34.
162. Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 143 (Ct. App. 2004).
163. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892 (Mass. 1999).
164. See Chambers, 2002 WL 1940145, at *10.
165. Id. at *9.
166. Id. at *10.
167. Id.
168. For example, the court stated that "Carol's acts and directives predating conception, while
biologically not providing the genetic material necessary to conceive the child, constituted a symbolic
act of procreation." Id. at * 10.
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D. Tennessee, New York, and Florida: Strict Statutory Interpretation of
Parental Status
Other states have taken a much more constrained attitude toward de-
fining parenthood when faced with such situations. In sharp contradistinc-
tion to the decision reached in E.N.O. in Massachusetts and Chambers in
Delaware, Tennessee, New York, and Florida have taken much more re-
strictive postures in defining what a parent is, limiting visitation rights to
those who meet a strictly defined statutory definition of parent. Tennessee
has not adopted either version of the Uniform Parentage Act as a basis for
its family law. 169 In In re Thompson, the Court of Appeals for Tennessee
dealt with two cases factually similar to the Massachusetts and California
cases described above. 170 The resulting decision held that only individuals
meeting the statutory definition of legal parent, which excludes non-
gestational homosexual partners, can assert parental rights to custody or
visitation regardless of intent, behavior, or the best interests of the child. 171
169. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), 9B U.L.A. 377 tbl. (2001); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000),
9B U.L.A. 4 tbl. (supp. 2005).
170. In re Thompson, 11 .W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
In the first case, White v. Thompson, a lesbian couple who had lived in a "committed intimate
relationship," id. at 915, had discussed throughout the course of their relationship the possibility of
having and raising a child together. After five years together, Thompson underwent a successful artifi-
cial insemination. White contributed to Thompson's support during and after the pregnancy, and when
the child, J.T., was born. Its name was based on relatives of both White and Thompson. After J.T.'s
birth, White continued to provide support and care to J.T. The relationship between White and Thomp-
son ended approximately one year after the birth of J.T. White continued to provide care an support for
J.T. for some time thereafter, until Thompson began refusing or interfering with White's visitation and
denying White telephone access to the child. White petitioned the lower court for regular and frequent
visitation rights predicated on the best interests of the child. Thompson argued that White lacked stand-
ing to assert visitation rights. The court agreed with Thompson that White lacked standing and explic-
itly declined to address White's best interests of the child argument. White appealed. Id. at 915-16.
The second case, Coke (and Dooley) v. Looper, tells a very similar story. Coke and Looper, a
lesbian couple, had attempted for two years to conceive a child via artificial insemination. After their
son, J.C., was born in 1992, Coke and Looper entered into a coparenting agreement, under which both
parties would share in providing J.C. with food, clothing, and medical or remedial care until his eight-
eenth birthday, and that should the relationship end, both Coke and Looper would continue to provide
care. In that case, J.C. would reside with Coke, and Looper would have visitation rights. Looper and
Coke ceased to live together when J.C. was three years old, and they implemented a visitation schedule
between them until Coke and Donald Dooley, who had begun a relationship with Coke, filed a com-
plaint seeking a restraining order and damages against Looper. Looper filed an answer and counter-
complaint seeking that Coke and Dooley "be permanently enjoined from interfering with [Looper's]
relationship and visitation with the minor child and establish a visitation schedule." Id. at 917. Dooley
filed individually for a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing (as was argued in White) that
Looper lacked any standing to assert visitation rights. After a hearing, the court found that Looper, like
White, lacked any claim or legal interest in the child and thus lacked standing to assert visitation rights.
The court therefore dismissed her counter-complaint with prejudice and also granted an independent
motion to dismiss filed by Coke. Id. at 916-17.
171. Id. at 919.
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The consolidated cases were heard by the Tennessee Court of Ap-
peals 172 with a single question of law for the court to decide:
Whether a petition for visitation may be brought by a woman who, in the
context of a long-term relationship, planned for, participated in the con-
ception and birth of, provided financial assistance for, and until fore-
closed from doing so by the biological mother, acted as a parent to the
child ultimately borne by her partner. 1
7 3
The court began its analysis by looking to the manner by which "par-
ent" is defined by Tennessee law. 174 Tennessee Code section 36-1-102
defines the terms "legal parent" and "parent."'175 A legal parent is defined
by that section as (1) the biological mother of a child; (2) a man who was
married to, or attempted to marry, the woman who gave birth if the child
was born during the marriage or within three hundred days after the mar-
riage was terminated or a decree of separation issued by the court; (3) a
man who had been adjudicated to be the legal father of the child; and (4) an
adoptive parent of the child. 176 The term "parent" was defined somewhat
more loosely by the statute to include biological, legal, adoptive, or (for
certain limited purposes) stepparents. 177 The court remarked pointedly in a
footnote that although neither of the appellants were married to their re-
spective partners at the time the respective children were born, neither ap-
pellant could have been; Tennessee confines marriage to legal contracts
"solemnizing the relationship of one (1) man and one (1) woman" in order
"to provide the unique and exclusive rights and privileges to marriage."'
178
In its ruling, the court found that neither appellant satisfied the statu-
tory definition of parent as defined by the Tennessee Code. 179 The court
acknowledged that in common usage the term "parent" may sometimes be
defined more loosely as a person who shares mutual love and affection
with the child and who supplies care and support. 180 It declined, however,
to extend the definition of parent beyond the strict definition provided by
the statute. 181 To do so, explained the court, would be an unacceptable
exercise in judicial legislation. 182 Furthermore, the Tennessee Code grants
172. Id. at 913.
173. Id. at 917.
174. Id.
175. Id.; TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-1-102 (28) (West 2002).
176. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d at 918; TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-1-102 (28).
177. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d at 918; TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-1-102 (36).
178. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d at 918; TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-3-113.
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only parents, whether biological or adoptive, the legal right to custody and
control of their children, and the court reasoned that that extending those
rights to third parties would impair the parent's rights to custody and con-
trol. 183 The court flatly rejected the plaintiff's argument that they had acted
as de facto parents or in loco parentis as being without precedent or support
in Tennessee law, denying them any rights to visitation. 184 The court did
not, in its analysis and conclusion, approach the question of the best inter-
ests of the children. Thus, Tennessee's strict adherence to the statutory
definition of "parent" has the necessarily harsh effect of summarily depriv-
ing a child of a parental figure, regardless of how much and how long that
parental figure had played a central role in the life of the child.
Similar findings were reached in cases in New York and Florida. In
Lynda A.H. v. Diane TO., the Appellate Division of the New York Su-
preme Court held that a lesbian partner of a woman who had had a child via
artificial insemination lacked standing to obtain either custody or visitation
rights. 85 As in the cases described above, both partners had planned and
participated in the conception and the raising of the child during the course
of a long-term relationship that eventually failed. The trial court granted
temporary visitation rights to the non-gestational partner. 186
The appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in granting tempo-
rary visitation and that the petitioner was entitled to neither custody of, nor
visitation with, the child.187 The court held that under New York law the
custodial right of a biological parent is always superior to that of someone
without a biological relationship to the child unless the biological parent
has relinquished the right. 188 In the absence of any evidence that the bio-
logical mother had relinquished her rights on these grounds "the inquiry
ends."'189 The court held that because the petitioner in this case was neither
the biological nor the adoptive parent in this case, she had no standing to
seek visitation of the child, citing the strong policy considerations to the
contrary in New York regarding custody and visitation. 190
Likewise, in Music v. Rachford, the Florida District Court of Appeals
rejected the contention that a party in a similar factual situation was a de
183. Id. at 919.
184. Id. at 923.
185. 673 N.Y.S.2d 989, 990 (App. Div. 1998).
186. Id. at 990.
187. Id.
188. Id. The parental right can be relinquished by "surrender, abandonment, persistent neglect,
unfitness or other like extraordinary circumstances." Id.
189. Id. at 991.
190. Id.
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facto parent entitled to visitation rights. 19 1 In a brief opinion, the court
maintained that despite the petitioner's arguments that she was entitled to
de facto parental status, the controlling authority indicated that visitation
rights are established by Florida statutes and that "the courts have no au-
thority to compel visitation between a child and one who is neither a par-
ent, grandparent, nor great-grandparent."1 92 Although the Florida courts in
both the precedential case and Music declined to specifically define parent-
hood, these courts implied that only biological or adoptive parents can be
considered parents when determining visitation rights.
193
These cases in Tennessee, New York, and Florida all define parent-
hood narrowly and restrictively as arising from either a biological relation-
ship with the child or through adoption. 194 The term "biological
relationship" requires clarification, although the courts and statutes of these
states are generally silent on the precise meaning. By "biological relation-
ship," one might infer generally that either a genetic or a gestational rela-
tionship to the child exists. Claiming a genetic relationship, that is, that
either sperm or an ovum (and thus, half the child's genome) was provided
by the putative parent, would be the natural argument of men (who are
incapable of pregnancy) attempting to establish parental status. Women
claiming their genetic child carried by a surrogate mother would make the
same argument. Conversely, a gestational relationship would be the claim
of a woman who had carried to term a child conceived of another's fertil-
ized ovum. But how are these alternative definitions of "biological relation-
ship" to be resolved when, as in the California case of K.M. v. E.G., one
putative parent has a genetic relationship to the child (e.g., K.M., who do-
nated the ova) and the other putative parent carried the child to term but has
no genetic relationship to the child? Which form of "biological relation-
ship," if either, trumps in determining who is parent? Although it seems
unlikely that cases such as K.M. will ever be common in the state family
courts, modem reproductive technology is continuously providing expand-
ing choices to individuals, and it would seem equally unlikely that KM.
will long remain a unique case. To rely on a simple definition of "a bio-
logical relationship" as a determinant of parenthood may soon prove unsat-
isfactory in the determination of parental status.
191. 654 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
192. Id. (citing Meeks v. Garner, 598 So. 2d 261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
193. See id.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 170-90.
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E. Closing the Door Altogether: Pennsylvania and the Blocking of
Adoption
One argument against determining parenthood by either the "inten-
tionality" test or the "de facto parent" test is that the non-gestational partner
of a same-sex couple could always adopt the child to whom her partner has
given birth, establishing both adults as parents in the eyes of the law. 195
Leaving aside the fact that Florida, alone of all the states, has a statutory
ban on adoption by homosexual individuals that would prevent this strat-
egy, a recent case in Pennsylvania has established that attempting such an
adoption might be problematic. 1
96
In the case of In re Adoption ofR.B.F., a Pennsylvania court addressed
the question of whether a lesbian could adopt the twin children of her long-
time partner. 197 The children had been conceived through in vitro fertiliza-
tion with the assistance and support of the partner seeking to adopt.198
Writing for the majority, Judge Stevens held that, under the language of the
state Adoption Act, the intended adoptive mother could not adopt the twins
unless the gestational mother consented to giving up her rights as parent to
the boys. 199 Judge Stevens emphasized that the court's opinion was in no
way based on the petitioner's sexual orientation.2 00 According to Judge
Stevens, "the Adoption Act's clear and unambiguous provisions do not
permit a non-spouse to adopt a child where the natural parents have not
relinquished their natural rights, and, therefore, the Act does not afford [the
intended adoptive mother] a legally ascertainable interest, notwithstanding
the equal protection clause." 201 The court rejected the Appellants' argu-
ment that a de facto parent may adopt, an argument based on the language
of a section of the Adoption Act allowing "any individual" to become an
adoptive parent.202 Holding that the Adoption Act must be interpreted
strictly and in light of all of its sections, the court found that the language
195. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 139 (Ct. App. 2004) (E.G. had explored adoption
as a way to have a child of her own.).
196. But see supra note 5 (noting that in several states adoption by homosexuals is prohibited).
197. 762 A.2d 739, 740 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
198. Id. B.A.F. and C.H.F. had maintained a committed lesbian relationship for over thirteen years
before deciding to conceive and raise a family together. C.H.F. successfully underwent in vitro fertiliza-
tion and, in March 1997, gave birth to twin boys. The couple subsequently filed a petition pursuant to
the Adoption Act in the Court of Common Pleas, Lancaster County, which dismissed the petition with
prejudice. The petitioners then appealed the case to the Superior Court. Id.
199. Id. at 743.
200. Id. at 741.
201. Id.
202. Id. The Pennsylvania statute states that "[a]ny individual may become an adopting parent." 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2312 (2001).
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of section 2711 was controlling. 203 Section 2711 (d) requires that a parent
waive all parental rights before a non-spouse may adopt.204 Only a parent's
spouse, the court continued, could adopt a child without the parent being
required to waive all parental rights.205 Because the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture had forbidden same-sex marriages, members of same-sex couples are
prevented from adopting their partner's children unless their partner agrees
to waive all parental rights.206
Judge Johnson, in a dissent joined by Judges Kelly and Todd, rea-
soned that the humane intentions behind the Adoption Act, motivated by
"benevolent sentiments of the Legislature that passed it towards a depend-
ent class of our population," demanded a liberal interpretation of the Act
rather than the majority's strict interpretation. 207 Judge Johnson based his
dissent on three reasons: (1) the majority's strict construction of the Adop-
tion Act contravened the state's Statutory Construction Act and was con-
trary to legislative intent; (2) the majority failed to recognize the statutory
discretion afforded a trial court when deciding to decree an adoption in
spite of a parent's retention of parental rights; and (3) the majority's focus
on the nature of the relationship between the petitioners and its failure to
consider the interests of the children was inappropriate. 208 With respect to
the third reason, the court quoted from a Superior Court case, Blew v.
Verta:
Although courts have gone to great lengths to provide every child with
precisely one mother and one father, the realities of family formation and
parenting are considerably more complex. Lesbian-mother families are
but one altemative to the presumed form. In resolving disputes about the
custody of children, the court system should recognize the reality of
children's lives, however unusual or complex. Courts should design rules
to serve children's best interests. By failing to do so, they perpetuate the
fiction of family homogeneity at the expense of the children whose real-
ity does not fit this form.209
Judge Johnson stated his regret that the majority chose to turn a blind
eye toward the effect of the petitioned-for adoption on the lives of the chil-
dren.210 He further noted the inconsistency of such a decision, given that a
homosexual couple is completely at liberty, under Pennsylvania law, to
203. R.B.F., 762 A.2d at 741.
204. Section 271 l(d)(1) specifies with particularity the terms by which a valid waiver of parental
rights can be made. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 271 l(d)(1).
205. R.B.F., 762 A.2d at 742-43.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 745 (quoting In re McQuiston's Adoption, 86 A. 205, 206 (Pa. 1913)).
208. Id. at 745-51.
209. Id. at 748 (quoting Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 36 (1992)).
210. Id. at 748-49.
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adopt children and form a family unit as long as neither adult was related,
genetically or gestationally, to the children.
211
The majority's formalist approach represents, in their view, a proper
deference both to the legislature's role as the decision maker in matters of
public policy, and to the legislature's refusal to sanction same-sex mar-
riages.212 Yet the legislature's decision not to forbid gay couples from
adopting (as long as neither partner is related to the children) reflects nei-
ther policy nor bias against families headed by same-sex couples. Indeed,
as Judge Johnson noted in his dissent, the majority's rule inconsistently and
unreasonably penalizes one type of family headed by same-sex partners
(those in which one partner is a biological parent) and promotes other fami-
lies headed by same-sex couples (those in which neither party is biologi-
cally related to the adoptive children). 213 To extend this reasoning to its
logical conclusion, a partner in a same-sex couple could not adopt her part-
ner's biological child, but if the two decided to adopt another child from an
outside source, then she would be legally entitled to do so. The result
would be a family in which both partners were the parents of the child
adopted from outside the original family unit; but a biological child could
only call one of the partners (her biological mother or father) her parent, in
the legal sense of the word.214
R.B.F. demonstrates some of the difficulties facing same-sex couples
hoping to adopt their mutually conceived children. The "adoptive alterna-
tive," which promotes a strict statutory definition of parenthood as either
biological or adoptive, can be frustrated where, as in Pennsylvania, adop-
tion laws insist that a non-biological parent can only achieve parental status
at the expense of the biological parent, who must give up her parental
rights.215 These laws are designed to protect the inviolate status of a bio-
logical parent over that of a stranger, unless parental rights have been ter-
minated for cause; 216 however, these laws can also function to deny
211. Id. at 749.
212. Id. at 742.
213. Id. at 749.
214. In 2002, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania vacated the order of the Superior Court and
remanded the case for evidentiary hearings in the trial court. The court held that the Adoption Act
provides nonmarried prospective adoptive parents an opportunity to establish cause why the legal parent
need not relinquish parental rights, and that the opportunity to show cause had been denied by the lower
court's interpretation of the statute. The court cautioned that granting of such cause was within the trial
court's discretion and that their holding did not simply open the doors to all adoptions by unmarried
couples. The court did not address the appellant's contention that the Adoption Act denies equal protec-
tion of the law guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution as well as the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002).
215. See R.B.F., 762 A.2d at 742-43.
216. Id. at 743.
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parental status to an individual who has acted in the role of de facto parent
since conception. In the case of a de facto parent, no threat to the biological
parent is implied by granting to the de facto parent additional parent status.
Indeed, granting parental status in such a case would strengthen the cohe-
sive bonds of the family, legally and emotionally, surely a desirable object
in all cases.
III. CONSTRUCTING A MODEL FOR NEW DEFINITIONS OF PARENTAGE
Scenarios such as those described in this article in which non-
gestational, same-sex partners attempt to achieve status as parents after a
relationship fails, will inevitably become more common in the state courts.
The most recent federal census revealed that approximately one-third of all
lesbian households and one-fifth of all homosexual male households have
children. 217 Furthermore, although there are no strong data concerning rates
of divorce or separation among gay and lesbian couples in the United
States (where homosexual marriages are generally illegal), recent studies
suggest that the rate of separation for committed homosexual couples is
comparable to that of heterosexual couples. 218 With increasing numbers of
families headed by same-sex parents, and with separation rates comparable
to divorce rates of heterosexual couples, custody and visitation disputes
appear to have become a permanent fixture in the family law landscape.
Furthermore, the reproductive rights of lesbians are constitutionally pro-
tected, as with all individuals in the United States; one cannot prevent an
individual from reproducing merely because of that person's sexual orien-
tation.219 So families headed by lesbian partners will continue to be gener-
ated, even in the presence of laws preventing homosexual marriage or
adoption. As this Note has illustrated, different states have approached the
question of defining parenthood in same-sex families in very different
manners. But with the advent of more efficient reproductive technologies
and greater numbers of families headed by same-sex couples, American
courts need a legal definition of "parent" that can be consistently and
evenly applied to cases such as those described in this Note.
217. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2, at 9 tbl.4.
218. See generally Margaret Nichols, Lesbian Relationships: Implications for the Study of Sexuality
and Gender, in HOMOSEXUALITY/HETEROSEXUALITY 350 (D.P. McWhirter et al. eds., 1990). Although
relatively little data exists on the longevity of lesbian relationships, a single eighteen-month study
reported by Blumstein and Schwartz in 1983 found that lesbian couples had higher dissolution rates
than any other types of couples. Although social factors may complicate this, Nichols assumes that
there is little reason to believe that lesbian relationships are significantly longer-lived than gay male or
heterosexual relationships. Id. at 358.
219. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that procreation is a basic lib-
erty).
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First of all, the definition of "biological parent" needs to be more pre-
cisely defined. A "genetic parent" is one who contributes one-half of the
child's nuclear genetic material in the form of chromosomal deoxyribonu-
cleic acid (D.N.A.). 220 A "gestational parent" is one in whom a fertilized
ovum (fertilized naturally via intercourse or following in vitro fertilization)
implants itself into the lining of the uterus; the fertilized ovum forms a
placental connection with the mother and is eventually born. Historically,
for women, being both genetic and gestational parent were one and the
same. However, as this Note has demonstrated, it is currently possible for
one woman to be the gestational mother of a child to whom she has no
genetic relationship, and for her partner to be the genetic mother in spite of
the fact that she neither carried nor gave birth to the child.221 Alternatively,
one partner could be the gestational mother while neither is the genetic
mother if sperm and ova are donated by a third party (as can also happen).
Given these possibilities, it seems that to arbitrarily prefer or give superior-
ity to either definition over the other is an unsatisfactory solution. Cases
arising over disputes concerning surrogate motherhood agreements typi-
cally also involve a struggle to establish parental rights between genetic
parents on the one hand and gestational mothers on the other. Attempting to
ascertain who the "real mother" is in cases involving surrogate childbirth
has been controversial, and many have viewed the decisions with skepti-
cism. 222 However, in most of the surrogacy cases, the parties believed they
had an understanding that the genetic parents would have custody of the
child following birth: the surrogate mother typically would only carry the
fetus to term and deliver it.223 But even these seemingly straightforward
contractual arrangements seem to break down frequently amidst emotional
upheaval for all parties. Given the difficulty in asserting whether a parental
right determined by a genetic claim is superior to a right determined by a
gestational claim, state legislatures and courts might wish to view the idea
of genetic versus gestational claims to "biological parenthood" with mis-
trust and adopt a broader, more informed definition of motherhood that
embraces both.
220. Nuclear DNA is found in the nucleus of cells in the body and is the source of expression of
heritable characters. Mitochondrial DNA, found in cellular organelles called mitochondria, is inherited
strictly from the mother's ovum.
221. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 141 (Ct. App. 2004).
222. See Ardiss L. Campbell, Annotation, Determination of Status as Legal or Natural Parents in
Contested Surrogacy Births, 77 A.L.R. 5th 567, 575 (1993).




Given the difficulties in ascertaining claims of biological parenthood
and in determining whether genetic, gestational, or neither claim should be
superior, courts should employ the more reliable "intentionality test" as
employed in California in the case of Kristine Renee H. Courts can use this
test to establish de facto parental status, as has been done in both Massa-
chusetts and Delaware. If both partners act together, in concert, and by
agreement, to bring a life into the world, and if both parents act in a paren-
tal role during the early life of the child, providing emotional, physical and
financial support, courts should consider such activities as determinative of
parental status. As the court in the Delaware case of Chambers v. Cham-
bers declared, if both partners had not agreed to act together, the child
would not have been born. 224 The acts of creating a new life together with
the understanding that the pair would be forming a family unit with the
child and continuing to act as parents following birth should be sufficient to
establish both individuals as parents. This proposed standard is more inclu-
sive than the one employed by the California court in K.M. v. E.G. (which
looked only to intentional behavior prior to and at conception), and is simi-
lar to that employed both in Kristine Renee H. and in Massachusetts's "de
facto parent" decision in E.N. 0.225 The criteria employed in Kristine Renee
H. and E.N. 0. can be employed to distinguish cases such as those described
in this Note from surrogacy cases in which the original intent (barring
fraudulent misrepresentation) is that the gestational mother would give up
the child and the genetic parents and the child would form the subsequent
family unit. The intentions and behavior of both partners, before and after
birth, should be a determining criterion to be employed by the courts in
assessing parental status for the purposes of custody and visitation
rights. 226
Considering intentionality in determining parental status has an addi-
tional benefit. In discerning the intentions of both partners, both before and
after birth, towards conceiving and raising the child, the welfare and inter-
ests of the child also become an implicit and important factor in determin-
ing who is a parent. Although a few courts have acknowledged the harsh
consequences that their decisions have caused for children denied visitation
224. No. CNOO-09493, 2002 WL 1940145, at *10 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 5,2002).
225. See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892 (Mass. 1999).
226. Although the subject of same-sex marriage is currently unpopular in most of the U.S., intro-
duction of such marriages would substantially ameliorate the problems described in this Note. If a
married couple participates in the conception and rearing of a child there is a typically a presumption of
parentage for both members. This is certainly the case with in vitro fertilization in married couples.
Although adoption of same-sex marriage would necessarily mean applying the term "paternity" in a
gender-neutral manner, that would not be inconsistent with a gender-neutral definition of marriage
rather than a definition defining it as a union between one (1) man and one (1) woman.
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with one whom they perceived as a "mother," more often the courts are
silent on the matter, preferring to engage in formalistic statutory and com-
mon law analyses. 227 Small children, however, tend to love their parents
uncritically. The intense emotional bonding between a child and an adult
acting in a parental role is a commonplace miracle of human existence. It is
dependent neither on genetics nor gestation, as is routinely seen in indi-
viduals who adopt unrelated infants as their own. The courts do a serious
injustice in deciding to instantly remove one person from her status of
"parent," sometimes after years of caregiving, on making a decision that
that such an individual has no legal standing to ever again see the child she
treated as her own. As such, the use of the intentionality test represents an
important positive consideration of social policy in that it protects the inter-
ests of children of legally and socially sanctioned family units. Social pol-
icy concerns should dictate that children, who are vulnerable and generally
incapable of fending for themselves, should be able to depend on the pres-
ence and support of those whom they have always considered parents. This
is particularly so when those who have acted in a parental role ardently
desire to continue to do so. Given the new reproductive methodologies and
the changing social attitudes that have made the opportunity to generate a
family both feasible and societally acceptable for a greater variety of cou-
ples, the American legal system must ensure that the interests of all mem-
bers of the families so generated, particularly the interests of children, are
duly considered.
CONCLUSION
Emerging reproductive technologies and changing societal attitudes
concerning the makeup of a family have resulted in numerous cases where
former members of same-sex couples have been denied legal status as a
parent despite playing active roles in conception, birth, and childrearing.
Despite the current admixture of the states' political viewpoints on same-
sex marriage or families, such family units are now a fixture of the Ameri-
can social landscape, and the situations described in this Note are not sim-
ply going to go away. The states' legal systems thus require a consistent
and just set of definitions of parentage by which these disputes can be re-
solved. State courts need to adopt a definition of parentage that is broader
and more inclusive than traditional definitions. The biological definition of
parent needs to be expanded to embrace both genetic and gestational forms
of parentage, and neither definition should categorically exclude the other.
227. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 143-54 (Ct. App. 2004).
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Furthermore, a new definition of "parent" should be added to the list of
legal definitions of parentage, a definition based on participation by the
nongestational partner in conceiving, giving birth, and acting in a parental
role to a child; such definitions should not be excluded by either biological
definition.
EPILOGUE: KM. v E.G.
As this Note was preparing to go to press, the California Supreme
Court heard and decided K.M.'s appeal.228 The court reversed the decision
of the appellate court and held that both K.M. and E.G. were parents of the
twins. 229 Furthermore, the court held that the statute treating sperm donors
as if they are not natural fathers of children conceived with their sperm was
not applicable to the case. 230
In its analysis, the court noted an important similarity between this
case and that of Johnson v. Calvert, namely that the couples in both cases
intended to produce a child that would be raised in their own home.2 31 Al-
though E.G. disputed K.M.'s claim that she was a parent and not a donor,
the court found that the undisputed fact that the couple lived together and
intended to raise the conceived children in their home was controlling in
the determination that section 7613(b) did not apply.2 32 That statute has its
origins in the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973, which states that "[t]he do-
nor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemina-
tion of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if
he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived. '233 In its initial
adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act, the California legislature made a
single critical change and expanded the reach of the provision to extend to
both married and unmarried women.2 34 Thus, as the court explained, Cali-
fornia's adoption of the modified Act afforded both married and unmarried
women protection from paternity claims made by a semen donor, and it
protected the donors from possible paternity claims asserted by married and
unmarried women.23
5
228. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005).
229. Id. at 675.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 679 (citing Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 n.10 (Cal. 1993)).
232. Id. at 680.





"AREN'T YOU LUCKY YOU HAVE TWO MAMAS?"
According to the court, the California legislature had intended this
change to make artificial insemination available to single women.236 But
the court found that there was no reason to believe that the legislature had
intended to expand the reach of the statute to apply where an unmarried
man donated semen to impregnate his unmarried partner in order to con-
ceive a child that would be raised in the couple's joint home.237 Because
K.M. and E.G. were living together and intended to raise the children in
their joint home, the court found that the lower courts' reliance on section
7613(b) was misplaced and that the statute was inapplicable.238
The court found that K.M.'s genetic relationship to the twins estab-
lished a maternal relationship, as did E.G.'s giving birth to the children. 239
The court noted that although it had stated in Johnson that a child may have
only one natural mother, Johnson did not preclude "a child from having
two parents both of whom are women. '240
The court held that because the Uniform Parentage Act determined
parentage of the twins, both K.M. and E.G. were parents-K.M. genetically
and E.G. gestationally.241 Furthermore, because both were parents, the
"intentionality" was inapplicable-K.M. did not dispute the fact that E.G.
was the twins' mother, but she asserted that she was the twins' mother in
addition to, rather than instead of, E.G.242 Thus, because there was no "tie
to break," the intentionality test applied in Johnson was inappropriate for
this case.
24 3
The court expressly declined to expand the intentionality test to cover
cases such as K.M.'s, noting that the Uniform Parentage Act did not explic-
itly use intent to conceive in outlining the determination of parental
status.244 As the court explained, if a man engaged a sexual intercourse
with a woman who falsely assured him that she was incapable of becoming
pregnant, the man would still be the natural parent of any resulting child
despite his lack of intent to become a father. 245
Finally, the court found that the consent form signed by K.M. did not
bar her from asserting parental rights, despite the form's claims to the con-
236. Id. at 679-80.
237. Id. at 680.
238. Id.
239. Id.








trary. 246 According to California Family Code section 7632, "[r]egardless
of its terms, an agreement between an alleged or presumed father and the
mother or child does not bar an action under this chapter. '247 The court
held that a woman who supplied ova for impregnating her lesbian partner
with the understanding that the resulting child will be raised in their joint
home cannot waive her responsibility to support that child.248 Also, such a
waiver cannot "effectively cause that woman to relinquish her parental
rights., 249
The California Supreme Court's decision represents a vindication of
the Uniform Parentage Act, but it is a narrow application of that Act. In
rejecting the intentionality test of Johnson, KM potentially narrows the
scope of that test. KM is an unusual case in that both partners qualified as
"parents" under the code; such was not the case in Kristine Renee H. v.
Lisa Ann R., in which only one parent satisfied the code's biological defini-
tions of parent and in which the intentionality test was invoked. 250 How-
ever, the court left open the California Family Code's alternative definition
of "parent" as "one who takes a child into his home and holds it out to the
world as his own" that was employed in Kristine Renee H.251 Thus, the
court left this as a possible alternative approach in expanding the role of
parentage to fit the evolving face of the family unit in America. The Uni-
form Parentage Act of 2000 deleted this definition, 252 but perhaps future
versions of the Act should consider its reinclusion in order to provide the
flexibility and protections provided to non-gestational partners in same-sex
relationships who wish to attain the legal status of parent.




250. 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 127 (Ct. App. 2004).
251. See K.M, 117P.3dat682.
252. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204, 9B U.L.A. 311 (2001).
[Vol 81:773
